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A STATUS REPORT ON LITIGATION AF~ECTING HISTORICALLY 
BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES with Postscript 
On April 12, ltt3 Hississippi Hearing 
J. Clay Smith, Jr.· 
I am honored to participate in this great conference on "~e 
FUture of America's Historically Black Colleges and Universities: 
Post Ayers \ A Strategy for Survival and Excellence.' " My 
responsibility at this juncture is a narrow one: it is to give you 
a status report on litigation affecting historically black colleges 
and universities. I plan to do just that organized as follows: 
First, I will review the United State Supreme Court's opinion in 
united states v. Fordice, 112 S.ct. 2727 (1992). I will then 
address the sUbstantive issues in three states in which there is 
active post Fordice litigation; namely, Alabama, Louisiana and 
Mississippi. 
Fordice Case 
On June 26, 1992, the united states Supreme Court issued its 
opinion ~n United states y. Fordice and determined that the 
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School of Law and the Howard University School of Law, AprilS, 
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Presidential Peer Seminar, Panel on "Implications for HBCUs of 
Supreme Court Decision: u.s. v. Fordice," August 4, 1992, Hilton 
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principles of Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 
(1954); Brown y. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 
AI), applied in the context of a public university system operated 
by the state of Mississippi. In an 8-1 decision, the Court found 
that the state of Mississippi does not fulfill its mandate under 
'Brown merely by adopting race-neutral admissions policies where 
other existing policies traceable to th:e segregative Q§ .iYDl system 
are still in place. The Court also enunciated the proper standard 
for the low~r court to use in determining whether a state has 
sufficiently eliminated all aspects of its ~ jure discriminatory 
policies. 
A. FACTS 
Mississippi's public university system dates back to 1848, 
when the University of Mississippi was founded to educate white 
persons. Additional, segregated institutions were later founded, 
and to date there remain four institutions originally formed to 
educate white persons (hereinafter historically white institutions 
or HWls): Mississippi state University (1880), Mississippi 
University for Women (1855), University of Southern Mississippi 
(1912), and Delta state University (1925). In 1871 the state 
founded Alcorn state University as "an agricultural college for the 
education of [the state's] black youth." Fordice at 2732. Two 
more Historically Black Colleges and universities (H~CUs) were 
subsequently founded by the State: Jackson state University (1940) 
to train Black teachers, and Mississippi Valley state University 
(1950) for vocational training. 
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Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Brown I and Brown II, 
Mississippi's segregated public college system continued. 
Attendance of the first Black student at the University of 
Mississippi had to be ordered by the court. Meredith v. Fair, 306 
F.2d 374 (5th cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962). However, 
in the years that followed, the "segregated public university 
system in the State remained largely intact." Fordice at 2732. 
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) took 
measures to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in 1969, and 
"requested that the State devise a plan to disestablish the 
formerly de iYn segregated" system. Fordice at 2732. Four years 
later, the State submitted a "Plan of Compliance" which outlined 
measures to improve opportunities for students in the university 
system. HEW rejected the Plan of Compliance. The Board of 
Trustees, which oversees Mississippi's public university system, 
amended the plan, but HEW found the Plan, even with modifications, 
unsatisfactory. The Board adopted the Plan anyway. 
In 1981, the Board designated to each of the State's eight 
institutions "mission statements" which identified the purpose of 
each institution. Three predominantly white universities were 
designated as "comprehensive": University of Mississippi, 
Mississippi State, and Southern Mississippi. These three colleges 
were subject to the greatest amount of resources and program 
offerings. Jackson State University, was designated as the sole 
"urban" university with less funding for research and academic 
programs. The remaining institutions, two HWIs and two HBCUs, were 
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designated . as "regional," and has the most narrow academic 
objectives. 
B. Majority Opinion Written bv Justice White 
The Court acknowledged th~t "there was no dispute that the 
state of Mississippi had a constitutional duty to dismantle the 
dual school system once operated and mandated." The primary issue 
is "whether the state has met its affirmative duty to dismantle its 
prior dual university system. I. Fordice at 2735 (emphasis added). 
Justice White wrote that prior Supreme Court cases established that 
a state's obligations under the constitution were not met until the 
state "eradicates policies and pract~ces traceable to its prior ~ 
j,yn dual system that continue to foster segregation." l.£. 
The Court determined that although I'a student's decision to 
seek higher education has been a matter of choice, ,. vestiges of a 
university system's Q§ j,yn segregative policies goes beyond 
recognition of the state's adoption and implementation of race-
neutral admissions policies. The Court wrote: 
That college attendance is by choice and not by 
assignment does not mean that a race-neutral admissions 
policy cures the constitutional violation of a dual 
system. In a system based on choice, student attendance 
is determined not simply by admissions policies, but also 
by many other factors. Although some of the.e 
factors clearly cannot be attributed to state 
policies, many can be. 
Fordice at 2736 (emphasis added). Further, the Court determined 
that there still remain discriminatory effects from "policies 
traceable to the ~ j,yn system," which must be "reformed to the 
extent practicable and consistent with sound educational 
practices." 
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The Court rejected application of the analysis contained in 
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) as inapplicable in hiqher 
education. In Bazemore, the Court had held that the State was not 
responsible for the factors upon which people selected particular 
4-H Clubs that were funded through the State. In Fordice, the 
Court found that "Bazemore plainly does not excuse inquiry into 
whether Mississippi has left in place certain aspects of its prior 
dual system that perpetuate the racially segregated hiqher 
education system." Fordice at 2737. Where the State "perpetuates 
policies traceable to its prior system that continue to have 
segreqative effects ••• and [where] such policies are without sound 
educational justification and can be practicably eliminated, the 
state has not satisfied its burden-that it has dismantled its-prior 
system ...... ~ The Court found that the standard applied by the 
district court was erroneous because it failed to make these 
inquiries required for compliance of the university system under 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Court held that had the district court applied the correct 
legal standard, it would have found from the record that there are 
"several surviving aspects of Mississippi's prior dual system which 
are constitutionally suspect." Fordice at 2738. Although the 
policies are "race-neutral on their face, II Justice White wrote that 
they "substantially restrict a person's choice of which institution 
to enter and they contribute to the racial identifiability of the 
eight public universities." The Court mandated that Mississippi 
justify its policies "or eliminate them." l5L.. certain remnants of 
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the Mississippi's prior Q§ ~ segregated system highlighted by 
the Court are policies concerning admissions, program duplication, 
mission statements, and maintenance of all eight of the systems 
educational institutions. 
1. Admissions 
The Court found that the present standard for "automatic" 
admissions, which relies on higher ACT scores for admission to the 
HWls than for the HBCUs, has its roots in the prior ~ ~ system, 
was originally implemented IIfor a discriminatory purpose," and 
still causes "present discriminatory effects." Fordice at 2739. 1 
The Board attempted to just.ify the differential admissions policies 
in the 1970s by determining that the lower ACT minimum scores for 
admission to the HBCUs was necessary because "too many stUdents 
with lower scores were not prepared for the historically white 
institutions •••• II Fordice at 2739. However, the Court determined 
that the differential standards "requires further justification in 
terms of sound educational policy." Fordice at 2740. 
The Court also found problematic the fact that the 
comprehensive institutions would not consider the applicant's high 
school grades as a factor to predict college performance. The 
record established before the district court studies showing that 
the gap between grades achieved by Black and white students is 
narrower than performance on the ACT. Justice White wrote that 
1 The court noted that in 1985, 72% of white high school 
students in Mississippi scored 15 or better on the act, whereas 
less than 30% of all blacks earned tht score. Thus, "it is not 
surprising then that Mississippi's universities remain identifiable 
by race. Fordice at 2740 n. 10. 
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these studies would "suggest[] that an admissions formula which 
included grades would increase the number of Black students 
eligible for automatic admissions to all of Mississippi's 
universities." ~. Thus, with respect to the state's admissions 
standards, the Court found that sole reliance on ACT scores as a 
method for maintaining a dual system is traceable to the prior de 
jure segregated system and "seemingly continue. to have segregative 
effects ...... .xg. "The state has so far failed to show that the 
ACT-only admission standard is not susceptible to elimination 
without eroding sound educational policy." Id. 
2. Program Duplication 
The district court found that many programs offered at the 
HBCUs were unnecessarily duplicated by the HBls, e.g. 29% of 
undergraduate programs, and 90% of graduate programs.~. The 
court found that it "can hardly be denied that such duplication was 
part and parcel of the prior dual system of higher education --
the whole notion of 'separate but equal' required duplicative 
programs in two sets of schools -- and that the present unnecessary 
duplication is a continuation of that practice." Fordice at 2741. 
The Court determined that the district court erroneously 
placed the burden to prove the constitutional defect of unnecessary 
duplication on the aggrieved plaintiffs. Fordice ·at 2740. Rather, 
the Court found that under Brown, the "burden of proof falls on the 
state, and not the aggrieved plaintiffs" to establish whether such 
duplication of programs facilitates the state's prior ~ ~ 
segregated system. lQ.... In addition, the Court found erroneous the 
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district court's failure to recognize any "educational 
justification" for the program duplication. 2 
3. Institutional Mission pesignations 
The court of appeals found that "the institutional mission 
designations adopted in 1981 have as their antecedents the policies 
enacted to perpetuate racial- separation during the Q§ ~ 
segregated regime." Fordice at 2742. Notwithstanding this fact, 
the court of appeals upheld this aspect of the state's system as 
acceptable because of the state's good faith neutral aqmissions 
policies. ~ The Court overruled the court of appeals on this 
issue, finding that "different missions assigned to the 
universities ••• limits to some extent an entering student's choice 
as to which universities to seek admittance." ~ When combined 
with other aspects of the university system, the Court determined 
that this aspect, too, "perpetuate[s) the segregated system." l.Q. 
Given the discriminatory purpose for which the policy has its ties, 
the Court held that the district court must determine whether the 
mission policy is necessary to satisfy sound educational practices. 
2 strangely, the district court observed that program 
duplication by the state "cannot be justified economically or in 
terms of providing quality education." Fordiee at 2741. However, 
the lower court determined that there was no proof that the 
elimination of program duplication would decrease institutional 
racial identifiability, affect student choice, or promote 
educationally sound policies. Fordice at 2741. The majority in 
Fordice found that the district court failed in its analysis to 
consider whether, in facilitating program duplication, the state 
satisfies its duty to dismantle its prior ~ jure system. 
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4. Maintaining all eight universities 
The Court found that the state attempted to satisfy its 
constitutional obliqations by maintaininq all eiqht universities. 
However, the Court also found that "the existence of eight 
[institutions] ••• was undoubtedly occasioned by state laws 
forbidding the minqling of the races." ~. Given the close 
proximity of some institutions, the Court noted the district 
court's observance that "continuing to maintain all eight 
universities in Mississippi is wasteful and irrational[,]" 
especially given the limited financial resources available to the 
state for funding higher .education. ~ Although the majori~y 
opinion suggested that "closure of one or more institutions would 
decrease the discriminatory effects of the present system," the 
Court did not reach the issue whether c.losure is required under the 
constitution. Fordice at 2742-43. Thus, the Court remanded this 
issue for the district court to resolve. 
To conclude, the Court remanded the case to the district court 
for examination of each of these policies under the proper 
constitutional standard. The Court noted that just because an 
"institution is predominantly white or Black does not in itself 
make out a constitutional violation." Fordice at 2743. However, 
the state will not be permitted to leave in place p~licies 
traceable to its segregated past when such policies facilitate the 
racially identifiability of the universities, especially when they 
can be practicably eliminated without eroding sound educatio~al 
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policies. .l.sL.3 
C. concurring Opinion by Justice O'Connor 
Justice O'Connor agrees that public universities must 
naffirmatively dismantle their prior ~ ~ segregation" in order 
to have effectively eliminated the effects of that discrimination. 
Fordice at 2743. Justice 0' Connor "emphClsize[s] that it is 
Mississippi's burden to prove that it has undone its prior 
segregation, and that the circumstances in which a state may 
maintain a policy or practice traceable to ~~ segregation that 
has segregati ve effects are narrow. II Justice O'Connor 
indicates, citing Green v. ~ew Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 
430 (1968), that any justification for maintaining a remnant of the 
state's prior discriminatory past should be viewed very 
skeptically, and that the state has a "heavy burden" to justify 
maintaining that policy. Further, the state must also show that 
"it has counteracted and minimized the segregative impact of such 
policies to the extent possible. 1I Fordice at 2744. 
D. concurring opinion by Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas agrees with the majority opinion that policies 
traceable to the state's prior ~ ~ system that cause 
discriminatory effects must be "reformed to the extent practicable 
3 The Court rejected any proposal by private petitioners that 
it mandate the upgrading of the HBCUS if solely to make the schools 
"publicly financed black enclaves..... However, the Court 
recognized the possibility of increased funding for the HBCUS as 
part of the state's obligation to achieve full dismantlement of the 
state's segregated past. Fordice at 2743. 
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and consistent with sound educational policies." Isl. However, 
Justice Thomas indlcates that the "standard is different from the 
one adopted ••• in Green ••• because it does not compel the 
elimination of all observed racial imbalances ...... lsL.. In that 
regard, writes Justice Thomas, the Court's opinion does not signify 
the "destruction of historically Black colleges or the severing of 
those institutions from their distinctive histories and 
traditions." Fordice at 2746. Absent a current discriminatory 
purpose, where policies traceable to a state's seqregati ve past are· 
challenged, the court must determine whether the policy produces 
adverse impacts and whether there exists any educational 
justification for the policies. 
Further, in analyzing the burden of proof, Justice Thomas 
indicates, citing Washington v. Dayis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that 
the State has a higher burden of proof of disproving discriminatory 
intent, even though the standard announced by the majority opinion 
does not rely on the Washington case. 4 In Washington y. Davis, the 
Court placed the burden on plaintiffs to prove the existence of 
discriminatory purpose or intent in cases involving testing of 
applicants for public jobs. Justice Thomas suggests that in the 
context of higher education, the Washington v. Davis test "flips," 
so that the burden of proof not fallon the shoulders of the 
plaintiff, but rather on the State to show an absence of 
discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect, and any sound 
4 This burden could favor the BBCUls argument relative to 
funding because funding disparities is a remnant of past 
discrimination. 
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educational reasons for the policy. 
Although the public HBCUs were founded as a tool of 
segregation, Justice Thomas indicates that "there exists 'sound 
educational justification' for maintaining historically Black 
colleges" because these institutions have expanded educational 
opportunities for Black students. Justice Thomas states that the 
HBCUs offer "institutional diversity" that can and should survive 
under the Court's majority opinion. Specifically, Justice Thomas 
states, 
~. 
Although I agree that a state is not constitutionally 
required to maintain its historically black institutions 
as such ••• I do not understand our opinion to hold that 
a state is forbidden from doing so. It would be ironic, 
to say the least, if the institutions that sustained 
blacks during segregation were themselves destroyed in an 
effort·to combat its vestiges. 
E. Justice Scalia. concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part 
Although Justice Scalia agrees that the standard of Brown I 
does apply in the context of public higher education, he reject the 
burden of proof required by the State under the Court's majority 
opinion. Justice Scalia finds that the requirement resembles that 
stated in Green, and thus has no "proper application in the context 
of higher education." IA. 
At the outset, Justice Scalia is very critical of the various 
standards provided by the majority opinion, and finds the Court's 
opinion ambiguous and confusing. Fordice at 2747-49. Justice 
Scalia takes a much narrower view of the standard for desegregating 
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in higher education. Justice Scalia seems to side with the state 
of Mississippi, finding that in the context of higher education the 
only unconstitutional "derivations of that bygone system" are those 
policies that limit opportunity, or admission, on a discriminatory 
basis. ~. Further, Justice Scalia states that discrimination in 
higher education is most appropriately analyzed under the Court's 
opinion in Bazemore. 
Bazemore's standard for dismantling a dual system ought 
to control here: discontinuation of discriminatory 
practices and adoption of a neutral admissions policy. To 
use Green nomenclature, modern racial imbalance remains 
a "vestige" of past segregative practices in 
Mississippi's universities, in that the previously 
mandated racial identification continues to affect where 
students choose to enroll -- just as it surely affected 
which clubs students chose to join in Bazemore * * * Like 
club attendance in Bazemore ••• attending college is 
voluntary, not a legal obligation, and which institution 
particular students attend is determined by their own 
choice •••• 
Fordice at 2750 
Under Justice Scalia's analysis, the only discriminatory 
barrier to higher education can be "discriminatory admissions 
standards. II Fordice at 27515 Justice Scalia writes that once such 
barriers are eliminated, a state is "free to govern its public 
institutions ••• as it will •••• "· lsi. However, where new 
discriminatory barriers to admissions arise, there must be a 
finding of discriminatory intent and causation. 
Washington v. Davis. 
M., citing 
5 Under Justice Scalia's narrow analysis, the only area of 
review for the district court would be a determination as to 
whether Mississippi's reliance on the ACT discriminatorily excludes 
Black students from the HWls. Fordice at 2751. 
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Justice Scalia warns that the test provided by the 
majority opinion, i.e., "compelled inteqration," will result in 
the "elimination of predominantly black institutions." J. Scalia 
Fordiee at 2751, 2752. He indicates that the majority opinion 
dissuades measures by a State to provide equal fundinq of HBCUs and 
HWls, (Fordiee at 2752), stating that the c~urt's prohibitory 
language against "duplicate proqrams" inh~bits such equal fundinq 
as "part and parcel of the prior dual system." Ish Justice Scalia 
finds that the continued existence of HBCUs "is not what the 
Court's test is about, and has never been what Green is about. I. 
,Ig. 
*** •• ** 
Alabama Case 
On December 30, 1991, six months prior to the Fordice 
decision, Judge Harold L. Murphy, District Judge of the Northern 
District of Alabama issued his decision in Knight v. State of 
Alabama, 787 F. supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991). Plaintiffs in 
Knight had sued the State on several grounds: Among these grounds 
was that in 1975 Alabama had racially frozen the academic mission 
of BBCUs in that state by issuinq "Planning Document Number One." 
Secondly, Knight sued to remedy the disparate land grant funding as 
between Alabama's whites colleges and its HBCUs, includinq the 
inequality in funding facilities. 
The Knight Case is presently on ~ppeal in the united states 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: The Knight plaintiffs do 
not believed that the district court order provides an adequate 
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remedy to correct past discrimination consistent with the Fordice 
case. 
The Knight appellants all contend and agree that the district 
court erred in concluding that· the state did not discriminate 
against HBCUs in 1973 when it froze their academic mission. The 
district court ruled that this act was not discriminatory because 
the state limited the mission of some white schools. Therefore, 
relying on a rational basis theme, the court concludes that the 
state acted within a "sound education practice" and refused to 
determine that "Planning Document Number One" was an act of 
intentional discrimination. Oddly, the court I s judgement was made 
after it spend a number of pages describing racial discrimination 
against black people and Hacus in its December 30, 1991, Order. 
DOJ/Mission Designations: The language of the Department of 
Justice's (DOJ) brief before the court is lukewarm, contending on 
this point, in support of the Knight appellate, that "Fordice may 
well support appellant's contention," that the state of Alabama 
did particularly discriminate against BBCUs in 1973 when it froze 
their academic missions. Brief 43-44. 
DOJ/Land Grant Funding: DOJ's brief supports the Knight 
appellants. The language on this issue stronger as DOJ states that 
it has "serious questions about the court's reasoning." To DOJ the 
discriminatory funding under pertinent federal statutes is clear. 
DOJ does not argue for reversal of the district court order, I 
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don't think, it merely suggests to the Eleventh Circuit that the 
disparate funding can be remedied under the court's decree. 
without going into great detail, the district court's order did 
recognize the Alabama A&M University receive a preference for any 
~ high demand programs awarded in the Huntsville area, but it is 
far from clear whether this form of remedy adequately corrects the 
years of past discrimination and the attendant"consequences of many 
years of state imposed disparate funding. It remains to be seen 
just how strong the DOJ will stand on this point. 
DOJ !Facilities: The district court order gave Alabama state 
University $9,873,178 and Alabama A&M University $10,628,306 to 
eradicate" the remnants of discrimination in facilities funding. 
The Knight appellants claim that such amounts are inadequate, and 
challenged the formula applied by the district court in arriving at 
these figures. The DOJ is on board with the Knight appellants, and 
believe that the court should retain jurisdiction over this issue 
in order to amend the terms of the remedial plan as required. 
Fordice mandates that the Alabama take corrective action "necessary 
to achieve a full dismantlement" of the remnants of discrimination. 
Fordice at 2743. 
The state of Alabama argues that the district court applied 
the correct legal standard consistent with Fordice. The state 
argues that the correct standard is to remedy any continuing 
effects of discrimination. The state argues that measures claimed 
by private petitioners do not require remedy because these areas, 
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although historically affected by the state's discriminatory 
policies, no longer have a discriminatory effect and do not affect 
student choice. The state argues that the district court's failure 
to extend the remedial decree to the areas outlined by petitioners 
was not an abuse of discretion. 
The state argues as follows: 
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to 
alter the mission designations of ASU or AAMD. 
A. Mission Designations 
state disagrees with Knight's assertions that maintaining the 
mission designations is impermissible under Fordice. state argues 
that altering mission designations so as to create a HBU as a 
"flagship institution" would foster, rather than inhibit, 
segregation, and would unnecessarily channel educational resources 
from HWUs that already educate 59% of Alabama's black students. 
Further, district court already ordered that the ACHE give the HBUs 
preference in the award of high demand programs. The district 
court's remedy on placing high demand programs at the HBUs is more 
workable and effective. 
B. Additional Funding for HBUs 
Considering differences in the HBUs, the state argues that the 
HBUS have been equitably funded for decades. This is the case 
whether one examines educational and general funding, funding per 
headcount students, funding per full time equival.ent student, etc. 
state argues that the court was correct in finding that the HBUs 
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have been equitably funded for years. Further, in terms of 
funding, the HBUs have protection afforded to them through the 
legislature. states notes that as a result of the increased 
numbers of black state legislators in Alabama, state appropriations 
to HBUs have dramatically increased. Thus, further judicial 
protection is not necessary. 
c. Additional facilities for HBUs 
The state argues that the district court should not be 
required to direct the state to provide additional funding for 
facilities at the HBUs. The state argues that when funds are 
allocated to HBUs, like to HWUs, the state leaves it to the 
institutions to decide how to spend the funds. The state will 
generally not "micromanage" an institution. The state notes, 
however, that testimony at trial showed that ASU and AAMU spent 
tremendous sums of state funding on athletic complexes, radio 
stations, and fine arts centers, "when faced with accreditation 
requirements which go unmet because of inadequate building space 
and library collections that are plainly insufficient." 
II. Federal Land Grant Funding for AAMU 
Finally, the state argues that conducting the state's 
agricultural research and extension program under the control of 
Auburn is not a vestige of segregation. The state argues that the 
district court was correct in finding that the federal land grant 
funds would have gone to Auburn absent the state's discriminatory 
policies "Auburn was already in existence as a thriving land grant 
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college when the * * * funds became available" and that this 
"accounts in large measure for that institution securing the 
benefits and obligations of those federal funds." 
The Alabama case is pending resolution in the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
Louisiana Case 
After the Supreme Court's decision in Fordice, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a October 30, 1990 decision, which 
had granted summary judgment against the United states and in favor 
of the State of Louisiana with respect to claims by the United 
states challenging the dual system in higher education. u.s. v. 
Louisiana, 751 F. Supp. 606,608 (E.D. La. 1990). 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Eastern District 
of Louisiana "for further consideration in light of The United 
states Supreme Court's decision in pnited states v. Fordice. See 
Opinion And Order in u.s. v. Louisiana, Dec. 23, 1992, at 1-6. 
On December 23, 1992, the Eastern District of Louisiana 
reinstated its prior order in favor of the United states against 
the· state of Louisiana. Accompanying the opinion was an order 
setting forth the Court's final remedial plan in the Louisiana 
Case. (The remedial plan had previous been adopted by the court on 
July 19, 1989, modifying the Special Master's proposed plan. 718 
F. Supp. 499). 
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The elements of the remedial plan is the current d~rection for 
desegregating higher education in Louisiana, subject to the outcome 
of pending appeals. If the remedial plan were implemented today 
the elements of its implementation would be as follows: 
The Court's Remedial Plan. On July 19, 1989, the court adopted 
a remedial plan, modifying the Special Master's proposed plan. 718 
F. Supp. 499. On December 23, 1992, following remand for 
consideration of the record under Fordice standards, the court re-
adopted the plan, with minor changes (see Dec. 23, 1992 Judgment). 
The plan requires the following: 
(A) The four governing boards will be disbanded with 60 days 
of the "Implementing Date,,6 and their governing authority will be 
vested in a single governing board (Judgement at 2). 
(B) The single governing board, within 120 days of the 
Imp~ementing Date, will develop a system to establish new 
classifications and mission for all state institutions (Judgement 
at 5-8). LSU-Baton Rouge will be the flagship school, with the 
most graduate and research programs and the most selective 
admissions criteria (Judgement at 6). Louisiana Tech, Southern-
Baton Rouge, University of New Orleans, and University of 
Southwestern Louisiana will offer significant doctoral and other 
graduate programs in addi tion to their four-year undergraduate 
6 The court stated that the "Implementing Date" will be 35 
days after entry of the Judgment or, if the case is stayed on 
appeal, after final appellate review (Dec. 23, 1992 Judgment at 2 
n.2). 
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programs and adopt selective admissions criteria (Judgement at 6-
7) • The remaining schools--Grambling, Nicholls, Southern-New 
Orleans, LSU-Shreveport, McNeese, Northeast, Northwestern, 
Southeastern -- will have limited graduate and research programs 
and less selective or open admissions (Judgement at 7). The court 
said all new admission standards will be implemented for the 
"Implementation School Year I" whic~ the court defined as the school 
year which occurred in the calendar year which fell 500 days after 
the Implementing Date (Judgement at 6 n.6). Accordingly, the new 
admission provisions would not be applied until at least one, and 
more likely two, full school years had passed. 
(C) Within 120 days of the Implementing Date, the state will 
end its general policy of open admissions, and develop selective 
admission standards for the five schools identified as doctoral 
schools (Judgement at 8). The selective admissions at Southern-
Baton Rouge will be effective only after. three years. Each college 
will set aside 15% of its admissions for admissions exceptions, 
with 10% for admission of other race students (whites at PBIs 
(Historic Black Institutions) and blacks at PWIs (Historically 
Public White Institutions», which will be implemented during the 
Implementation School Year (Judgement at 9). 
(D) The single board will implement a system of program 
review and management. Within 180 days of the Implementing Date 
the president of the board shall review all course offerings and 
recommend standards for program consolidation, transfer and 
elimination, and enrollment levels for each academic program 
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(Judgement at 12). The board will take appropriate action by the 
Implementing School Year (~). The program transfers to which 
Grambling and Louisiana Tech have agreed will be implemented by the 
Implementation School Year (Judgement at 13). 
(E) The board will develop budgets for the newly classified 
schools, including expenditures for improving the quality of the 
Public Black Institutions (PBIs) whenever fiscally possible, with 
priority also given to capital needs which might attract other race 
students, in time for submission of the budgets for the 
Implementation School Year (Judgement at 15). 
(F) The board will develop a. program for recruitment and 
retention of other race students, faculty and staff at all schools 
within 120 days of the Implementing Date (ibid.), and will set 
realistic annual integration goals and financial incentives for all 
schools (Judgement at 17). The court has appointed three people to 
a monitoring committee, which evaluate all institutions' compliance 
with the remedial plan and achievement of desegregation goals on a 
quarterly basis. The committee will report to the single board 
(Judgement at 17-18).7 
On January 20, 1993, the Eastern District Court of Louisiana 
issued an order holding that the factual findings contained in its 
prior opinion were sufficient to sustain its determination with 
7 The plan also required the state to organize its two-year 
community colleges into one system, requires the LSU Law Center to 
recruit minority students for the next school year, required 
Southern University Law Center to remain in compliance with ABA 
standards, and required the State to desegregate faculties and 
staffs through recruitment of other race employees. Judgement at 
13-14. 
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respect to the state of Louisiana's liability. Order And Reasons, 
U.S. y. Louisiana, Jan. 20, 1993, at 1. On February 4, 1993, 
Louisiana filed a motion requesting the court to stay and suspend, 
pending appeal, of the Judgment and Order entered by the District 
Court on December 23, 1992 and all previous Judgments and Orders 
Reimposed therein its order--which practically would cause the 
state to cease implementing the Remedial Plan. The request for the 
stay was supported by Governor Edwin Edwards. The DOJ filed an 
opposi tion to Louisiana's motion on February 17, 1993. On February 
19, 1993, Louisiana's motion was denied by the Eastern District 
Court of Louisiana. Order And Reasons, U.S. v. Louisiana, Feb. 19, 
1993, at. 1. 
The state of Louisiana has appealed its case to the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, where it contends that the Remedial Plan 
places the cart before the horse because Louisiana never conceded 
liability by entering into settlement negotiations with the united 
states before the Court issued its Order reinstating summary 
judgment. Louisiana also challenges the summary judgment as 
improper because they claim there existed a factual dispute with 
respect to: (1) whether there is a causative link between state 
policies and racial identifiability at Louisiana colleges and 
universities and (2) whether those state policies can be justified 
as educationaily sound, among other things. 
Mississippi Case 
After the Supreme Court's ruling in the Fordice case, the DOJ 
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sought to get the parties together on the future direction of the 
case. The parties met on September 8, and October 5, 1992 to talk 
settlement. No progress was made. See Ayers V. Fordice, 
Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable Neal B. Biggers, J.L. 
united States pistrict Judge, at Oral Presentation/status 
Conference Thursday, October 22, 1992, at 13, 14 (Hereafter Status 
Tran). 
On September 24, 1992, Neal B. Biggers, Jr., United states 
District Judge for the Northern District of Mississippi scheduled· 
a status conference for October 22, 1992. Each party was asked "to 
submi t. • its propose~ remedies ;. • • including • • • [ 1] 
whether the state should continue to maintain eight universities; 
[2] whether the state should continue its present admissions 
policy; [3] whether the state should continue duplicative programs 
at some of its various universities; and [4] funding and staff for 
the state universities." Ayers V, Fordice, Order Setting Status 
and Scheduling Conference, Sept. 25, 1992. 
The status conference was held in October 22, 1992. At that 
hearing the court was "presented [with] the parties' view points 
concerning the specific course further proceedings [would take]." 
At the hearing Alvin o. Chambliss, Jr.,' counsel for plaintiffs 
took the "position that the State should continue to operate eight 
universities." status Tran. 6. Chambliss also suggested that the 
Governor of Alabama appoint at least 5 blacks as overseeing 
governors of the University system. status Tran. 8. He argued 
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that scholarship funds should be made available so that white 
students could attend BBCUs and so that black students could attend 
HWls. status Tran. 10-11. Chambliss informed the cou~t that "the 
fact of the matter is that by year 2000-, if nothing happens, mostly 
black college campuses are going to be majority white in terms of 
the [faculty]." status Tran. 11. Chambliss proposed that the 
court "leave the black faculty at the black schools alone ••• and 
concentrate on [the dearth of] blacks in decision making positions 
[in HWls]." status Tran. 11-12. Chamb1iss's last point was on the 
inadequacy of funding of HBCUS. ~ at 12. 
A DOJ representative informed the court that attempts by DOJ 
to facilitate agreement between all concerned thus far had failed. 
status Tran. 15. DOJ gave a view on "what [they thought] should be 
in the final plan [although] it is impossible • • • to give a 
detailed plan proposal." status Tran. 16. 
DOJ continued: "[B]ut things we think must be in the plan 
would be the following: 
"[1.] the people who operate [the educational] system must 
approach the issues and policies in a non-discriminatory manner. 
"[2.] the board [of Governors] must be designated ••• 
"[3.] the ••• access for minority students to all schools 
[is essential] and access for white students to historically black 
colleges [is essential]. 
11[4.] the court should require each of the institutions to 
come up with strategies that they know work best in terms of 
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recruiting students • • • 
II [5. ] the admissions standards • • • may determine what kind 
of faculty the school will be seeking • • • other race faculty 
members. 
" [6. ] there is unnecessary program duplication • • • All the 
court needs to do is require that the defendant immediately produce 
information showing what programs are offered by each institution. 
"[7.] [Regarding Jackson state], Jackson state [should] be 
comprehensive • • • be on the same footing with other institutions 
• • • designated as comprehensive schools • • Jackson state should 
control the City of Jackson in all respects. 
"[8.] [the) final plan should include monitoring provisions. 
II [9. ] [DOJ closed its oral presentation stating, that it 
thought] "the court and the government and the parties have an 
obligation to look carefully at any recommendation to close a 
school, (I think referring to Jackson st~te, Alcorn and Mississippi 
Valley) [because] at the present time. • • black schools continue 
to serve a very vital function of educating • • • minority 
students, and until [Mississippi] has eliminated discrimination in 
all respects, and white students and black students • • • have 
equal opportunity to attend any institution, [DOJ does] not think 
that the process should start by closing black schools, and, 
therefore, eliminating, access. 1I status Trans. 16-21. 
Counsel for the state of Alabama seized upon the Ford ice case as 
the basis for the closing of schools, status Trans. 24. (Fordice 
had raised the closing question in the opinion.) They then appear 
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to attempt to base their theory for closing on economic efficiency, 
perhaps to avoid an unavoidable prospective correct remedy: 
equalization of state funds commensurate to its past discrimination 
against students and faculty at HBCUs. status Trans. 25. 
At this hearing (Oct. 22, 1992), Counsel for the state of 
Mississippi first disclosed a document not before disclosed to any 
party proposing remedies. It is titled "Defendant Board of 
Trustees of state Institutions of Higher Learning's Proposed 
Remedies, October 22, 1992." status Trans. 26. 
Mississippi's plan proposes to allow Jackson state's "unique 
mission [to] remain urban." status Trans. 27. Mississippi Valley 
and Delta state "are proposed to be merged to create a unit of the 
University of Mississippi to be known • • • -as Delta Valley 
University at Cleveland. Alcorn state University is proposed to be 
a unit of Mississippi University. Mississippi University for women 
is proposed to become a unit of the University if Southern 
Mississippi." status Trans. 28. 
It is clear from the Transcript of the October 22, 1993 
hearing that prior to the hearing Mississippi's proposal was 
neither shared with Chambliss, DOJ, (status Trans. 68) or 
Chambliss's co-counsel, Robert Pressman. Pressman, addressing the 
court said, "We come to court and are met with some charts where 
the paper is unwrapped in the courtroom, and some fancy computer 
outlines of a plan, and then a inch thick plan which counsel didn't 
see fit to.give to us in advance so that we would be able to really 
address the concept that the state had raised." status Trans. 54-
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55, 60 (Jackson state), 62 (Delta state). 
Pressman reminded the court that "Mississippi Valley gave 
1,295 baccalaureate degrees to black persons, and its going to end 
• • • Delta state • • • has given 500 degrees to black persons • • 
• We will show • • • the problem of denying black persons equal 
access to higher education so that they get degrees in a proportion 
that is fair to their proportion in the popul"ation • • • II status 
Trans. 61-62. 
Interestingly, the court, itself newly informed about 
Mississippi's Remedial Plan, seemed to support the plan without any 
evidence before him to support it. status Trans. 63. DOJ's legal 
representative called the proposal 'Ia comedic plan," status Trans. 
67. (Nat Doug~as), and argued that lithe time has come to speak to 
this process that the defendants should make available whatever 
information they used to make these decisions. status Trans. 72. 
Chambliss argued that the proposed plan "will substantially kill 
black higher education in the state • .' • I think, Your Honor, that 
basically we need to decide in this state whether we will educate 
our black people or send them back to the cotton fields (Applause). 
'The Court: All right, There will be order in the court.'" status 
Trans. 79. 
o The court directed all counsel "to submit to the [Mississippi 
defendants] a list designating what in their view are properly 
challengeable policies and/or pract~ces of [Mississippi's] system 
of higher education or 'remnants' of the prior de jure segregated 
system. II These designations were to be sent to the Mississippi 
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defendants on November 2, 1993. Then the parties were to confer by 
November 12, 1992 and work out a stipulation to be presented to 
Judge Biggers by November 19, 1992. Order« October 23« 1992, at 3. 
To date, no agreement has been reach in the Mississippi case. 
However, perhaps after a recently scheduled hearing set for April 
12, 1993 is held, we will know more about the direction that the 
Mississippi case will take. 
Fordice-Ayers postscript 1 
Report on April 12, 1993 Hearinq to Intervene and Pile Briefs 
Xdentification of De Jure seqregation Remnants to be Examined 
at Trial and Hatters Relating to Pre-trial Discovery 
(hereafter Transcript) 
Days following the Conference at the University of the 
District of Columbia, a hearing was held before U.s. District Court 
Judge Neal B. Biggers, in the Northern District of Mississippi (as 
set forth in the caption). This postscript summarizes the critical 
issues raised in this hearing. 
First of all there were several motions before the Court. One 
group had filed motions to intervene in the case as interested 
parties. A second group wished to file amicus briefs (friend of 
the court). 
The Intervenor Group. Mississippi University for Women and the 
Mississippi University for Women Foundation (MOW and MUWF)(argued 
that it was concern about the remedy that could affect MOW) 
Transcript 8-9. 
The Amicus Group. Delta state Alumni Association (DSA) stated 
an interest in filing a brief to draw attention to the "College 
29 
Board's proposal" to create lithe new university at Cleveland called 
Delta Valley, and surnamed into the University of Mississippi. DSA 
argued that such a merger would not save costs and that DSA viewed 
the merger as closing Delta state. DSA argued that it could not 
see how "merging Delta state with the University of Mississippi 
system will in any way eliminate any remnants of de jure 
segregation •••• II Transcript 12, 13. For response on this point by 
the state of Mississippi, ~ Transcript 50-51 (a merger is a 
merger) • 
The Ole Miss Alumni Association requested permission to 
participate in the proceedings from time-to-time to clarify 
specialized facts unique to the University of Mississippi, such as 
the effect that any remedy might have on the dental school. 
Transcript 14-17. See also Transcript 19-22 (Mr. Montgomery, an 
alumnus spoke in support of OMAA position, pointing out his concern 
about a remedy that would transfer the vet school to Jackson state 
University). 
Mississippi University for Women Student Body and Government 
argued that "Black women and black men and white men were all 
entitled to an education when MVW was conceived, and it was 
conceived to fill the role that was then missing for the education 
of white women. Since the end of the de jure segregation, 
MUW ••• has ••• attracted enough blacks that it has the highest 
percentage of students who are African American of any historically 
white institution. It has the highest graduate rate for Afric~n 
American students of any Mississippi's e~9ht institutions of higher 
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learninq." Transcript 23-24. 
The Amicus or Intervenor Group. Mississippi Valley state 
Alumni argued that the College's Board's proposal of October 22, 
1992 would alienate MVS: "[W]e run the risk of being alienated, 
just wiped out completely •••• if [MVS] closes, I think the 
devastation in the community will be such that education for black 
Deltans will not be the same as we have known it ••• and will never 
be the same again." Transcript 17-18. 
opposition To Motions to Intervene and to Pile Amicus 
The state of Mississippi 
Counsel for the state of Mississippi: "We oppose them ••• II 
Transcript 22. Claimed "that intervention would ••• cause a 
practical nightmare. II Transcript 28. As to the motions ·to 
intervene: "[W]e think it would delay the proceedings ...... lR1,g. 
The Department of Justice 
Counsel for the united states: n[W]e continue to vigorously 
oppose intervention by any party petit~oner in this lawsuit ••• with 
respect to the briefs as amicus, we would request that if the Court 
would deem that it would be useful to have briefs submitted by 
these persons, by these entities, that it would be at the remedial 
stage, limite~ to providing written comment; that they would have 
no right to discovery, no right to presentation of evidence, or 
anything ...... Transcript 29. 
The Avers Plaintiffs (Private Plaintiffs) 
Preliminary Issues raised by the Court: are private plaintiffs 
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and the U.S. Government "adverse to one another?" Counsel for PP: 
"[H]aving disagreements doesn't mean that you are adverse to one 
another in your claims before the Court. ,. Transcript 31. PP do not 
support the intervention of MOW. l12.i£. "with regard to the other 
request and these parties indeed, our position is that this is a 
very important case, that all points of view should be heard, and 
at the time in which they all express ,interests; namely, the 
remedial stage, they should have the ability to file amicus briefs, 
not exceeding 25 pages ...... Transcript at 32. 
Disposition of Motions to Intervene or to File Amicus Briefs 
On April 13, 1993, the Court deni~d the petition of MOW Alumni 
Association and the MOW Foundation to intervene. Beyond that the 
Court's Order is silent. It neither granted or denied the other 
petitioner's requests. Ayers v. Fordice, GC75-9-B-Q, Order. April 
13, 1993. 
Issues for Discovery 
The Court: "We have what is perhaps the most important issue 
to be decided before this case is trie~ and before the parties can 
even prepare for trial, and that is [1] the identification of the 
remnants of de jure segregation which the Court will examine at 
trial for the purposes of determining whether or not they are still 
encouraging desegregation of the higher education system, and [2] 
then whether or not, if that be the case, they can be practically 
eliminated or the education justified." Transcript 34. 
At the time of the hearing the parties had not agreed on what 
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remnants of de jure segregation continue to foster segregation. 
The state of Mississippi appears to have agreed to eliminate "some 
of the remnants, not conceding that they continue to foster 
segregation or that they cannot be practically eliminated or the 
education justified, but they have agreed to eliminate them ...... 
Transcript 35. The state of Mississippi later attempts to have the 
burden of proof assigned to plaintiffs: "Now, we have, of course, 
put before the Court [Mississippi's] definition of a remnant as a 
policy or practice traceable to or rooted in the unconstitutional 
de jure past, but before the burden shifts to the state and we 
conduct remedial proceedings, not only do you have to identify the 
policy or practice, but that policy or practice today must be 
presently causing discriminatory effects ••• The plaintiffs are 
improperly focusing on present discriminatory affects ••• They are 
not focusing on a present policy rooted in the past ...... [The Court 
disagreed with this argument. Transcript at 55]. ~ inclusive 
discussion of these points. Transcript 52-55. 
The crossroads faced in this litigation is the 
characterization by the parties of what remnants of de jure and de 
facto discrimination continue to fo~ter, influence and effect 
present efforts to eliminate segregation in higher education in 
Mississippi. This is another way to phrase the issue. What 
follows is the opinions of counsel on the scope of discovery to 
ascertain and to fix the facts to answer these issues. Plaintiffs 
argued for the broadest scope of discovery, and prevailed [~ 
Transcript 69-71], but note the exchange between the Court and 
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Plaintiff's counsel: 
The Court: The Supreme Court listed four areas [of concern 
(see pp 6-9 of text above)], and they said this is not an exclusive 
list, but they said these four. It is these four areas are 
constitutionally suspect. Now you [Plaintiffs] have listed thirty-
five areas ••• [A]re ••• thirty-five areas ••• proper for 
consideration •••• ? .. Transcript 39. 
" ••• Mr. Pressman: ••• [T]he Supreme Court basically discussed 
the four areas that were in the briefs cited by the Solicitor 
General as.examples. Beyond that, we simply go to the language of 
the opinion [which list many other concerns] ••• So, basically, we 
find very broad language by the [Supreme] court, and no indication 
that any particular subject matter area is off limits." Transcript 
39-41. (other Counsel agreed with Pressman. Transcript 47 (Mr. 
Crenshaw». 
The District Court judge appears to attempt to channel the 
discovery issues into the four areas listed above (at pp 6-9), 
apparently attempting to have Plaintiffs to tailor their discovery 
(the thirty-five areas) as subparts of the four areas. Transcript 
42. Howev~r, the record does not. exact the Plaintiffs. Transcript 
48 (The court states that the Supreme Court "succinctly say this is 
not an exclusive list [that is, the four areas].") 
The State of Mississippi attempts to limit discovery on 
disparate funding of black colleges appears to have been lost. The 
State of Mississippi argued: "The law does not require ••• that the 
predominantly black universities be upgraded as if to be publicly 
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financed exclusively black enclaves by private choice ••• We do not 
see funding alone as a remnant. We certainly recognize the 
relevance of funding in the' provision of resources, as relates to 
the implementation of any remedy to be provided by this Court ••• , 
but the Unites states Supreme Court has already rejected the demand 
for channeling the money according to predominant racial presence, 
rej ected the request to upgrade cart blanche the predominantly 
black universities ••• So, our position on funding would be that it 
is not a remnant." Transcript 53-57. (But see, Mr Crenshaw's 
statement: " ••• the funding for the facilities has to be considered 
as part of the remedy, an agent of the remedy. ") Transcript 62-63. 
[Author's note: Crenshaw is right. The state's argument is 
overbroad, and is more properly stated as rendered previously in 
the text above at p. 10, footnote 3. The state's claim that "[t]he 
acute shortage of the available black faculty with terminal degree 
creating not only a lack of supply. but a highly competitive 
situation" is not only vague, but places it blinders on to the fact 
that the de jure and de facto system in Mississippi made no 
historical effort to create a pool of available black faculty. The 
lack of present supply of black faculty in Mississippi is directly 
linked with and to the past. This appears to be an effort to 
reintroduced the neutral principle methodology that the united 
states Supreme Court rejected.] 
The Court rejected the state of Mississippi's effort to limit 
dis·covery "whether it pertains to mission statement or 
funding[,etc.J" So, for that reason, the plaintiffs may proceed at 
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this time with the conducting of discovery in such areas as you 
claim are remnants of de jure segregation, which, of course, the 
Supreme Court said still foster segregation." Transcript 70. 
Date Discovery commences: May 1, 1993, The period of 
discovery i~ six months. Transcript 81. 
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